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NEW EXPOSITION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE by A. E. KROEGER.

Part Second.

Knowledge posits itself for itself as a determined Freedom of Quantitating, or as Nature.

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- ‡ 1. Knowledge cannot posit itself for itself as a determined freedom of quantitating without both *thinking* that Freedom as the ground of all quantity, and at the same time *contemplating* a quantity as factically the prior.

The standpoint and the result of the last reflection, which constituted absolute knowledge, was a determinedness of Freedom, as a quantitating, through absolute Being or Thinking. Let it be well understood, as a quantitating generally, but by no means yet as the positing of a fixed *quantum*. Upon this we must now reflect again, altogether in analogy with the former reflections. As absolute knowledge went beyond itself

and placed itself before itself, in its form of reflection, as a reciprocity of substantiality and accidentality, so also here.

Let us first, however, observe the following:—This reflection is, as we have seen, a multiplicity, if it views itself with respect to its components, which, in that case, are not knowledge, but merely the necessary components of knowledge; but as knowledge it is simple, and the very final point of all knowledge. We now propose to descend from this point, in order to discover *standpoints* of knowledge, which in themselves are again equally manifold. Their particular character must always be well remembered.

Now, while we said formerly, this reflection occurs; we here express ourselves thus: this reflection *must* occur. This *must* is a conditional must; it means, *if* a knowledge is to be, then a reflection must have taken place. But as knowledge, from its highest absolute point of view, is accidental, a knowledge *must* not necessarily be, and the necessity, which we have demanded, is therefore only a conditional necessity. Yet on that very account we must prove the conditional necessity of this and all other reflections which we shall hereafter put forth, i. e. we must deduce the reflection as such.

We approach this deduction. The knowledge, spoken of, is the knowledge of a determinedness of *quantitating*. But this is not possible, unless the quantitating, in its agility and mobility, as it was described above, is realized, and unless the focus of knowledge is concentrated in it. It must be well remembered: the quantitating, as such, in its form; and by no means yet a determined quantitating. The quantitating is for-itself only as a formal act. Where, then, should the determinedness come from?

This, then, would be the fundamental character of the new reflection. Let us immediately proceed to the representation of this reflection, and enter at once its central point. The act is, as we have said, a free quantitating, which is inwardly for itself, but at the same time reflects upon itself as confined and determined through absolute Being. The disjunction is clearly exposed: it is the opposition of confinedness and Freedom (of quantitating, of course, as such); the former is to be dependent *idealiter* upon the latter; the latter is to be dependent *realiter* upon the former. So much about this.

We proceed to the union of that disjunction. Only in so far as the freedom of quantitating is inwardly realized, i. e. as it contemplates itself, can it be taken hold of by a fixed Thinking. The Thinking, and whatever follows therefrom, is *idealiter* dependent upon contemplation. *Vice versa*, only in so far as this Freedom is subordinated to pure Being does this Freedom and the quantitating inseparable from it, as well as its contemplation, take place. In other words: only in so far as it is not, as it is consequently the pure Being, and presupposes its Not-Being in advance of its Being, is it an absolute originating. *Realiter* therefore, the contemplation of the quantitating, is dependent upon absolute Being and upon the determination of Freedom through absolute Being. In this closest reciprocity, this floating between the ideal and the real (in this thorough penetration of Contemplation and Thinking), and in the unity of both, which is no immediate object of knowledge, but knowledge itself, this reflection floats like every reflection—according to its specific character, of course—as reflection of the Freedom of quantitating.

We now proceed to the adjoining links of the argument.

1. The Freedom of quantitating *thinks* itself. Let us facilitate the comprehension of this proposition by calling to remembrance the conception of causality in the upper synthesis. There Freedom, as ground, was that through which the *quantum* (if any *quantum* was supposed as posited) was perceived in its determinedness. It was *realiter* thus determined in this manner, because Freedom had made it thus; and was perceived *idealiter*, because Freedom was perceived, as holding itself over and within it. But this Thinking—and this is the decisive remark—is no pure, original, but a syncretical uniting and reflecting Thinking, and Freedom was posited in it always in its factical *form* (but only the form) of determinedness. This Freedom is *here* thought pure and absolute, signifies: it is thought, in the highest universality, as the absolute, eternal, unchangeable ground of all possible quantity which can be thought. (The meaning of this can easily be explained: it is expressed in the general proposition which the Science of Knowledge has already uttered repeatedly, but which is now introduced into the real system of knowledge: *only* Freedom (whether actual or not, is here not

yet decided) *is the ground of all possible quantity*. But to us it is of importance that the derivation and the connection be understood, and, as this point is of the most important consequences, we shall add a few more words in relation to it.

In the common view, the Thinking pointed out here is related to the former as the general abstract proposition is related to the concrete: in the former, any determinedness of Freedom is posited as the ground of *some particular quantum*; in the latter, Freedom is posited as (absolutely by reason of its form) the only possible ground of all *quanta*. There we had an *application* of the conception of causality; here we have its own ground. Now we know well enough that this common view is altogether a false and wrong one; that each link presupposes the other one, and that abstractions, as commonly understood, have no existence. In the upper link Freedom was formal; could be and could not be. Here, as in the entire reflection, it is posited positively, and is materially determined, as quantitating, and as the only quantitating. The ground of this onliness, absoluteness, and universality, is itself absolute: the pure, on-itself-reposing, in itself unchangeable, and consequently an unchangeableness-asserting Thinking. Freedom is thus substantialized, and each of its possible quantitative states of determinedness becomes an accident for the very reason because the free quantitating is the connecting link of both.

2. Now to the second link. In the same way as we argued in the first synthesis, when representing absolute substantiality: Thinking is not possible unless contemplation takes place; so here also: The freedom of quantitating cannot be thought unless it has been contemplated, consequently not without the existence of a quantitating, and without this quantitating having already been found as existing. All Thinking of Freedom, as ground of all quantity, posits again a quantity, of which it cannot be said that it *is realized with (actual) Freedom* within consciousness (for here consciousness first begins), but which lies *beyond all consciousness*, in the not-being of consciousness, and which is only thought within consciousness as having its ground in the (from that very reason, not actual) Freedom. Where consciousness begins, this quantitating is not consciously produced, but is already found

existing within consciousness;—and of it we shall have to say nothing more, than that it may be the sphere of future possible acts of Freedom within consciousness, of the Freedom which posits itself and knows itself as such, or of actual Freedom. Only in so far as the contemplating consciousness—and without contemplation there is no consciousness at all—goes in itself beyond itself, thinks itself, and thinks itself as absolutely free, does it apply this contemplation to Freedom as its only possible (not actually to be *cognized*, but *thinkable*) ground. Nothing, however, is here to be said about the manner in which it is thus *ground*. This is unknown to us as yet, and nothing else is to be thought than what we have said.

Adding, however, in order to let the reader think something at least, what I can unhesitatingly add, that this latter view is ground of a nature (i. e. what is called nature, the absolute, within and before all knowledge presupposed nature), I immediately proceed to the following reflections.

§ 2. Hence all contemplating knowledge begins with a determined quantitating (World, Nature, &c.), which, however, it must think as accidental, or as having formal Freedom for its ground, and which it thus thinks by ascribing to itself a power of Attention.

Contemplation (in its originality) is, as we have said, quantitability; it has also been shown that all quantitability is posited in absolute knowledge as accidental (as that which can also *not* be—passing and changeable—not eternal); consequently, if it is, as *to be connected with a ground*, and, since it is quantitability, with Freedom. Here, then, is the connecting link, which leads us further; to the thinking of the accidental there attaches itself the thinking of Freedom, and, in so far as this accidentalness is thought as absolute quantitability, the thinking of absolute Freedom. In order to comprehend this quantitability (which in itself is only *form* of quantity, but which, for the sake of a better comprehension of the following thought, I not only permit, but even request the reader to think as possibly determined)—in order to be but able to comprehend it, I say, as accidental, the contemplation must describe or reconstruct its origin within itself: must construct itself as limiting itself from the absolute and in-itself-dissolving contemplation to this quantitability; thus making it a product of Freedom within knowledge. Not as if this quantitability were cre-

ated thereby—for we have seen that it appears together with the first origin of knowledge, and originates before all real consciousness—but it thereby becomes *accidental*. (The case is very simple; in form it is the same operation which, at least, we educated men perform every day, when we distinguish our representation of a thing from the thing itself;—although it may well be presumed that, for instance, savages or children cannot even do this, since to them, lost in wondering astonishment, both representation and the thing melt together, and cannot be kept apart. Now this very same operation is to take place here, only not in regard to a single object, but applied to the absolute ground of all objectivity, to quantifiability itself. This is done in form, with Freedom. To him who does not perform it, this contemplation does not become an object of his knowledge, because he does not elevate himself above it; it is to him knowledge itself: he is imprisoned within it and melted together with it, as the child is fused together with single objects. He describes within it the other natural phenomena as the mathematician, who reposes in the contemplation of space, describes his figures within it. All that we have said, the entire synthesis—with the exception of that one link in which he reposes—has for him no existence. He is one of those intelligences, mentioned before, who *have* reason, but *are* not reason, and do not elevate themselves to its conception.)

But what has *he* attained for whom it has existence? A *new* altogether unfettered contemplation—that of formal Freedom, which it is not necessary to describe here, since it will accompany us to the end; and which resigns itself to the *original* contemplation, or rather includes it, and within which, as its sphere and its Freedom, the Thinking of Freedom, and of all that which lies within absolute knowledge, is now alone possible. (This Freedom, torn loose from the original ties of contemplation, it is which lifts itself above the *found* knowledge.) The latter contemplation is to be the determining, the former the determined; consequently a relation of causality, but different from the one mentioned before, from the pure causality. The Ideal ground is the *effect*, the real ground the effecting. Here, consequently, we have the secondary relation of Causality, hinted at before. (To the primary we elevate ourselves

only by a transcendental view; and this has never occurred to former philosophers.)

Let us now review the foregoing.

From the one side, contemplating knowledge begins with a determined quantitatibility; determined, at all events, in so far as it is contemplated as quantitatibility within an altogether in-itself-dissolving freedom (i. e. for him who here realizes within himself the necessary contemplation. How it is for him who cannot do so, we are not yet able to state: his knowledge we do not describe at present.) This determined quantitatibility is the absolute, last ground of all contemplation, and, in contemplation, cannot be transcended; it is the original determinedness with which all consciousness commences and first becomes *real*; the known end of all contemplation. (This is the world, nature, objective Being, &c. There can be no more clearly defined conception: and I am sure that this one is sufficient and explains all; and yet some persons foolishly think that this last determinedness ought again to be explained and deduced.)

Now, this quantitatibility is thought, for the very reason of its immediateness, as *accidental*, but no knowledge can rest in the accidental (whose knowledge rests there does not comprehend it as accidental). We therefore penetrate necessarily beyond it through Thinking and *free* intellectual (in contraposition to the confined, sensual) contemplation. And there we find that all quantitatibility, from its very form, is simply *the result of the in-itself-reposing, in and for-itself being Freedom*, altogether as such, and has in and for itself no connection whatever with absolute Being; that there is consequently in all these representations altogether no *knowledge*, no truth and certainty, not only not of absolute Being, things *per se*, &c., but even not of any sort of connection with this absolute Being. We discover, on the contrary, as the last and highest, a *material* (we could not term it otherwise) determinedness of Freedom—i. e. in such a manner that it nevertheless remains in and for itself *formal Freedom*, and everything that follows therefrom—*through the absolute Being*. The knowledge of *this* determinedness is the real end of knowledge, and first gives knowledge. If, therefore, the contemplating knowledge is nevertheless to be a knowledge, it can be nothing

else than the *determination of the pure*, absolutely through-itself-existing, consequently not formal or quantitating *Freedom through absolute Being*, which is gathered up in the form of knowledge as an inner *formaliter* free knowledge and seen through it as through an irremovable veil, and knowledge is realized within knowledge—i. e. absolute knowledge, or certainty—enters, when this very harmony, this falling together of the two ground-forms of knowledge, the formal and the material, is realized.

Quantitability in contemplation, therefore, and its formal determinedness, deduced by us, are the result of the in-itself-existing formal Freedom. But that knowledge should *rest* in this contemplation, and should *find* itself as resting (for it is contradictory to rest in quantitability), results from the, we know not how, thought determination of pure Freedom through absolute Being. Whatever knowledge can hold stationary, whatever does not dissolve within its grasp, is nothing but that determination; and again, only through this quantitability can that determination be perceived, since quantitability, and it only, is the eye and the focus of actual *consciousness*. But let it be well remarked, that this harmony, this falling together of the two endpoints, takes place only beyond knowledge, because knowledge, as such, does not go further than to absolute quantitability. That harmony is known only in absolute Thinking; consequently only its *That* can be recognized, but its *How?* cannot be contemplated.

§ 3. Results.

The results of the foregoing may now be expressed in a generally comprehensible manner as follows; the words must, however, be taken very strictly.

1. The world—i. e. the sphere of quantitability, of the changeable—is not at all *absolute* in knowledge, nor is it absolute knowledge itself, but it arises solely on the occasion of the realization of absolute knowledge as its immediate character, as its starting-point (and this whole second synthesis, in which *absolute* knowledge realizes itself, contains something new, grounded in that knowledge). Indeed the world is altogether nothing else than the in-itself empty and unsubstantial form of the beginning of consciousness itself, the firm

background whereof is the eternal and unchangeable, or the Absolute Being.

The world of the changeable is altogether *not*; it is the pure Nothing. (However paradoxical this may sound to unconsecrated ears, it is evident to him who but for a single moment considers it thoroughly; and I cannot use expressions too strong. Whoever remains entangled in this form has not yet penetrated from appearance to Being; from supposing and guessing to knowledge. All the certainty such a person can have is, at the utmost, a conditional certainty—*if* space exists, it must contain something limited, conditioned by space;—a certainty which, however, he must at least comprehend in the *form* of absolute, pure Thinking.)

2. The imperishable does not enter the perishable, whereby it would cease to be the imperishable (the *indifference* of the Infinite and Finite of Spinoza, which we have already refuted); but the imperishable remains for itself and closed and completed within itself; equal to itself, and *only* to itself. Nor is the world perhaps a mirror, expression, revelation, symbol—or whatever name has been given, from time to time, to this half-thought—of the Eternal; for the Eternal cannot mirror itself in broken rays; but this world is picture and expression of the formal—I say, formal—Freedom, and is this for and in itself; is the described conflict of Being and Not-Being, the absolute, inner contradiction. Formal Freedom is altogether separated in the very first synthesis from Being; is for itself, and goes its own way in the production of this synthesis.

3. But knowledge lifts itself above itself and above this world, and only there, beyond this world, is it knowledge. The world, which is not wanted, joins knowledge without any coöperation on the part of knowledge. But beyond that immediateness, whereupon does knowledge repose there? Again not on absolute Being, but on a determinedness of the—not formal, of course, for that is altogether undeterminable, but *absolutely real* Freedom through absolute Being. The Highest, therefore, is a synthetical Thinking (even the seat of the highest substantiality), in which we meet absolute Being, not as *for-itself*, but as a determining, as absolute substance,—which is already a form of knowledge, as Thinking—and as absolute ground, which is the same. Hence even absolute knowledge knows only mediately of this absolute Being.

Now let the reader further remark the conception of this Freedom. It is *eternally, unchangeably determined*, even as and because that which determines it is absolute *Unity*. Even therefore in relation to it does the world proceed its own way. But again: a harmony of this determinedness is to arise in knowledge with the contemplation of quantitability. This determinedness therefore, and only it, must enter quantitability, or rather must be perceivable through quantitability in order to fill up the *hiatus* between two very unlike components of knowledge. Of this we shall speak in the following.

(I first insert, however, a parallel of my system with that of Spinoza, interpreting Spinoza's as favorably as possible. He has an absolute substance as I have; this can be described, like mine, by pure Thinking. That he arbitrarily separates it into two modifications, Extension and Thinking, I shall leave unnoticed. To him as well as to me—I interpret here to his advantage, as he speaks not only from the standpoint of knowledge generally, but also from that of the knowing individual;—*finite* knowledge is, in so far as it contains truth and reality, accidentence of that substance; to him as to me it is an absolute accidentence, unalterably determined through Being itself. He acknowledges therefore, as I do, the same highest absolute synthesis, that of absolute substantiality, and he also determines substance and accidentence much as I do. But now in this same synthesis—where indeed the difference must necessarily be, or we should be perfectly agreeing with each other—comes the point where the Science of Knowledge turns away from him, or, plainly spoken, where it can prove to him and to all others who philosophize in the same manner, that he has quite overlooked something; i. e. the point of transition from the substance to the accidentence. He does not even ask for such a transition; hence, in reality, there is none; substance and accidentence are in reality not separated; his substance is no substance, his accidentence no accidentence; he only calls the same thing now the one and now the other. In order to obtain a distinction he afterwards causes Being, as accidentence, to break into infinite modifications—another grave defect; for how can he, in this infinity, which dissolves within itself, ever arrive at firm fixedness, a finished Whole? I will consequently improve his expression and say, into a *closed* or completed *system* of modifications. And now,

leaving unnoticed everything else which might be objected, I will ask only: Is Being necessarily broken into these modifications, and does it exist in no other way? How, then, do you arrive at a Thinking of it as a Whole, and what truth has this your Thinking? Or is it in itself One, as you maintain? Whence, then, the breaking of it, and the opposition of a world of extension to a world of Thinking? The short of the matter is, you realize, though unconsciously, what you deny in your whole system, formal Freedom; Being and Not-Being: the ground-form of knowledge, in which lies the necessity of a separation and of an infinity for consciousness. The Science of Knowledge, however, posits this formal Freedom at once as the point of transition, and demonstrates the separation arising from it, not as that of absolute Being, but as the accompanying ground-form of the knowledge of absolute Being, or, which means the same, of absolute knowledge. The Science of Knowledge says: Absolute Being does indeed determine; not unconditionally, however, but under the rule just described; and its *accidence* is not *within it*—whereby it would lose its substantiality—but *without it*, in the *formaliter* free. Thus only is substantiality separated from accidentality in a comprehensible manner, and each made possible. The existence of knowledge—and only knowledge has existence, and all existence has its ground in knowledge—depends simply upon knowledge; not so, however, its original determinedness. Hence the accidence of absolute Being remains simple and unchangeable as absolute Being itself; and changeability is assigned to quite another source, to the formal Freedom of knowledge.

Should, therefore, the Science of Knowledge be asked as to its character in regard to Unitism—ἐν καὶ πᾶν—and Dualism, the answer is: That Science is Unitism from an ideal point of view, in regard to knowledge as real knowledge—knowing that the (determining) eternal One is the ground of all knowledge, of course beyond all knowledge;—and Dualism it is from a real point of view, in relation to knowledge as actual. Thus it has two principles, absolute Freedom and absolute Being; and knows that the absolute One can never be attained—reached—in a *real*—actual—knowledge, but can be attained only in pure Thinking.—In the balancing-point between these

two views knowledge stands, and only thus is it knowledge; in the consciousness of this Unattainable—which it, nevertheless, always comprehends, but as unattainable—does its essence as knowledge consist, its eternity, infinity, and incompleteness. Only in so far as infinity is within it—which Spinoza indeed designed—is it; but only in so far as it rests with this infinity in the One does it not dissolve within itself—from which Spinoza could not protect it—but is it a world, a universe of knowledge, closed—completed—within infinity.)

4. One point, about which I have asked the reader to remain undecided during the progress of our investigation, is now clear. Freedom must be thought—from a point of view which has not yet been designated, but which will hereafter be found—as ground of the determinedness of quantifiability; not, it is true, in a *factical* manner, but the real, eternal, and unchangeable Freedom, as determined through pure Being, must turn out to be beyond all consciousness—ground of the factical view of consciousness.

§ 4. Deduction of Space.

All consciousness begins with an already existing quantifiability, to which contemplation is confined. This state of confinedness must be *in* and *for* itself, must find itself as such, reflect upon itself as such, &c. This is a new reflection.

First of all: it is generally clear, and a matter of course, that this fixedness of contemplation, like that of knowledge, must be in accordance with the groundform of knowledge, a *For-itself*. In the present case, moreover, it is to be expressly posited as a For-itself. In order to secure our teachings against misinterpretation, let us remark the following:—A free, empty contemplation, according to the above, resigned itself to a state of confinedness. This, when regarded more closely, leads to nothing and explains nothing. If the contemplation is free, it is empty; if it is confined, it is not for-itself. Both must therefore be thoroughly united in such a manner, that the contemplation is *free* in its very confinedness; passing over, as it does, all the points of that confinedness at once with Freedom. Thus we receive a *new, infinite quantifying of quantifiability itself*.—Nothing and not even the difficulty

will, I think, prevent the reader from at once strictly comprehending this point.

The former proof was merely: If Thinking is to occur, contemplation must also take place; and from that proof we derived quantitability, with which consciousness consequently commences. Now the difficult and almost incomprehensible point which remained, was this: shall this quantitability be a determined quantitability or not? Indeed it can scarcely be conceived, what, if we speak of pure quantity, a determinedness of quantity might mean. (If anyone thinks he understands it, he misconceives our entire investigation, does not view quantitability pure, but mixes a *quale* with it in order to attain a *quantum*. Quantitability in itself is nothing else than the pure in-itself undetermined possibility of infinite *quanta*, which can receive their limitation only from the determinedness of the *quale*.)

It is true, that afterwards, when we had applied to it an absolutely empty Freedom, we spoke of determinedness, and accepted it as a proved fact, but only as a limitation of Freedom to *quantitability generally*. In short, quantitability is not posited in contemplation as it is posited in Thinking—i. e. not as a production of Freedom, but as something absolutely *found or given* beyond all consciousness; and since Thinking is not without Contemplation, it is evident that quantitability must present within knowledge an entirely contradictory view. This, strictly taken, altogether only *qualitative* limitation to quantitability is here now itself contemplated, and thereby an infinite quantitating obtained. The view has indeed changed, having become more definite.

The case stands now thus: Quantitating *materialiter* takes place with Freedom, and is *contemplated* as taking place with Freedom; *formaliter* it is *thought* as something, to which knowledge is confined.

After this general view, let us now enter into the branch-syntheses, and at first into that of Contemplation. Quantitating views itself as confined to itself; it quantitates, therefore, really and with Freedom; and if only to be able to view its own confinedness, presupposes itself, in this free quantitating, as its own necessary condition. Both links are altogether one. We must first become acquainted with one of them; let it be the presupposed.

This is the *permanent, absolute* contemplation ; hence manifoldness, which holds itself in a resting light, eternally and ineradicably the same. What, then, is it? It is, if knowledge is posited, the resting, permanent *Space*. If we know this space, we also know the pointed-out contemplation. Let the reader consider the following thought, which seems to me to light up the old darkness like a flash of lightning. Space is to be infinitely divisible. Now, if this is to be so, how then comes knowledge ever to take hold of space? Where has it finished the infinite division, and embraced the elements of space? Or, how does space ever attain its *inner solidity*, so that it does not fall through itself, does not thin off into a fog and vanish? If space is therefore, nevertheless, infinitely divisible, it is at least, from a certain point of view, also not so, or it could not *be* at all, and could not be *this*. Its manifold—not that within it, for of that we know nothing yet—must therefore mutually support itself, as it were, in order that space can support itself and attain solidity. Again, contemplation teaches everyone, at least, that we can perform no construction, which is always an agility within space, unless space rests and stands still. Whence this resting of space? Again : No one can construct a line without something mixing with the line, in the course of construction, which he has not constructed, nor ever can construct ; which he, therefore, does not add to the line while drawing it, but which he has carried along by means of space before ever commencing to draw the line : it is the solidity of the line. (If the line is a running through an infinite number of points, the line becomes impossible ; the points and the line itself fall to pieces. Nevertheless they would hang together within space, and are, in their infinite manifoldness, at the same time its continuity.)

Whence, now, this solid, resting and permanent space? It is the sufficiently described Contemplation (the For- and In-itself-Being of formal Freedom, which is a quantifiability), which presupposes, however, itself as *absolutely being* to itself, according to the demonstrated law of reflection of consciousness. It is the on-itself-reposing, firm glance of the intelligence ; the resting, immanent light, the eternal eye in-itself and for-itself.

How, then, is the *second* link of the synthesis related to

this? It is a free taking hold of itself within this contemplation; a constructing, remaking of the same, a loosening and again extending of space;—but let it be well remembered, a taking hold of what has already presupposed *itself*, since otherwise the first link would be lost, which must be guarded against in every reflection. Hence it is clear that the one cannot be at all without the other: no space without construction of the same, although not *it* (space), but merely the consciousness of it, is thereby generated (ideal relation); no construction without presupposing space (real relation). All knowledge of this description rests, therefore, neither in the one nor the other, but in both of the links, as was shown in the instance of the line. The mere direction of the line is a result of the last link of the freedom of construction; its concretion is the result of the permanent space. The drawing of the line is evidently synthetical.

We add the following remarks: *Firstly*, for this constructing process space is infinitely divisible; i. e. you can make an infinite number of points from which to construct within it. *Again*, space is evidently nothing but quantitability itself. The assumed determinedness is therefore and remains altogether formally a limitation to quantitability itself. We return here to the same proposition expressed above: formal Freedom, as such, is the only ground of quantitability and of all the results thereof. Even space is only quantitability, and nothing enters it which might originate from the thing *per se*. *Finally*, the substantial, solid, and resting space, is, according to the above, the original light, before all actual knowledge, only thinkable and intelligible—but not visible and not to be contemplated—as produced through Freedom. The construction of space, according to the second link of the synthesis, is a *taking hold of itself* on the part of light, a self-penetration of light, ever from one point and realized within knowledge itself; a secondary condition of light, which, for the sake of distinguishing it, we shall term *clearness*, the act *enlightening*.

COROLLARIA.—This deduction and description of space is decisive for philosophy, physics, and for all sciences. Only the last mentioned constructed and constructible space, which in itself is not at all possible, and would dissolve into Noth-

ingness were it not for the original in-itself-solid contemplation, has been held to be the only space; especially since *Kant*, whose system, in this respect, has done a bad service. (To him whose eyes have been opened there is nothing more funny than the ideas which modern philosophies promulgate about space.) Followed up, this view of the matter should have led to a formal Idealism. But people had a horror of that; so they went to positing matter (substance) into this spoiled space without considering that, if they had matter beforehand, space would have come to them without any further exertion on their part; or, that space without inner solidity (and this is the very ground of the famous matter or substance) dissolves into an infinite divisibility=Nothing.

Then they were afraid that if natural philosophy should attempt the construction of a material body, the powers of attraction and repulsion within it might one day lose their balance, without ever beginning to think that these two ideas are nothing more than a double view in the reflection of one and the same *balance*, the firm repose, which space carries within it.

§ 5. Deduction of the Groundform of Time.

We now proceed to an investigation which may lead us to the second branch-link of our synthesis. In the eternal space the manifold of it was lying quietly and steadily aside of each other before and in one glance, which is a glance, and one and the same glance only in so far as everything lies thus quietly and steadily together.

Reflect now upon any particular part of this contemplation. Whereby is such part kept in its solidity and repose? Evidently by all others and all others by it. No one part is in the view unless all the others are in it; the whole is determined by the parts, the parts by the whole, every part by every other part, and only in so far as it is thus is it the permanent contemplation which we have described. Nothing is, if all is not in the same standing unity of the view. It is the most perfect inner reciprocity and organization; and thus organization reveals itself already in the pure contemplation of space.

In the construction, on the contrary, we start from some one individual point, and the parts (for instance, the parts of the

above constructed line) come to follow in a certain order of succession, so that, this direction presupposed, you cannot arrive at the point B except from A, &c. But how have we been enabled to say what we have said just now? Only in so far as we posited such facts, formally at our pleasure; consequently, only in so far as we merely thought, and kept within the standpoint of construction. In the standing space beyond construction there are no points, no discretions, but it is the one concrete view just particularly described. Discretion, therefore—so we will express ourselves for the sake of the strictness of the investigation—has its origin in the Thinking of the constructing, and in what results therefrom, the changing of the constructing into a Thinking.

But wherein lies the ground of the determined law of succession? Firstly, *formaliter*, in the Freedom of the direction, which is altogether undetermined and changeable, floating in each point between infinity. This Freedom, therefore, must be presupposed, if a succession is but to be spoken of; and we thus arrive at the old proposition of Freedom as the ground of all quantitability—here, however, in a stricter, more definite sense. If Freedom, however, is once presupposed, then the succession is determined by the co-existence of the manifold in the standing contemplation or in space. The consciousness of the succession, therefore, like the previous consciousness, rests neither in the point of the construction, nor in that of the contemplation, but in both and in the union of both.

Now, while the lower, *objective*, Thinking or Constructing, always presupposing a determined direction grounded by its own Freedom within itself, is confined to the law of succession which contemplation furnishes, how is it *thought*? Evidently, as confined originally and beyond all Thinking and knowledge, in regard to every possible direction which it may give to itself; not *absolutely* confined, but under the condition of this or that particular direction which it gives to itself. Hence, as above, we presupposed an original necessary contemplation, so here an original, necessary Thinking is presupposed, and this itself is *thought*; for the designated point is surely a thought. But as the designated contemplation was and remained a mere quantitability, so this thought also is only quantitability, but a quantitability infinitely determinable

through Freedom of the direction. (Think one series, a second, a third, &c., and you have thought the separate determination of quantitability. But now you are to think no separate one, but simply *all* its determinations, and doing so you think a confinedness of Thinking.)

I have characterized quantitability generally above as nature, or as the material world. The law of succession, therefore, of which we here speak, is evidently the law of nature; and it is even now clear how Freedom is confined to it. Not only in so far as it must first be realized within itself in order to have a succession; but further, in so far as, after it has this succession, none of the laws of this succession apply to Freedom, unless Freedom has chosen itself a direction, of which directions an infinite number are placed before it from each point. (Space is here an altogether adequate picture.)

Even after the world is, and supposing that somebody were tied down within the world, unable to pass beyond it—were to remain in the second link of the synthesis, in which case his knowledge would be the production only of the contemplation originated beyond all knowledge—the world would still be to him not an absolute *power*. For even in the world infinite directions are possible, the choice of which depends upon him: hence his relation to the world, and the law of the world, by which he is bound, would always depend upon himself after all.

The complaints about human infirmity, weakness, dependence, &c., can no more be refuted than the complaints about the weakness of human understanding. Whoever asserts them, will probably know and have experienced them; we can trust his assurance. Only, we may beg him not to include us. Nevertheless it is often impossible to think ill enough about the immediate reality. However low we may draw its picture, experience nevertheless exceeds it. But he who thinks ill of mankind, according to its general faculty, blasphemes reason and at the same time condemns himself.

One more remark, which forces itself upon us and appertains to the subject: The described objective Thinking—each link of which is dependent upon another, which is *not* dependent upon the former (while in the conception of the resting space each link was dependent upon the other), where the dependence is there *ore* only one-sided, and does not move

retrogressively—carries at the same time the formal character of *Time* within it, the movements of which, as we well know, are related to each other in that manner. Nevertheless, I do not wish to be understood as having already deduced time. The succession, here pointed out, has moreover a characteristic which seems itself contradictory, that the discrete thoughts can nevertheless be also placed alongside of each other and surveyed in one glance. But we lack here still the solidity, the stoppage of the moments which we must have in time. We may, therefore, have arrived at the highest *ground of time*, but on no account have we arrived at its reality itself in the appearance. It is, however, clear that, if we are to elevate ourselves above time and to explain it we must not be tied down to its moments, but must survey them at one glance, as we just now did, with our links of Thinking, according to the law of succession.

We may, however, apprehend already what will be necessary to obtain this solid and real time; i. e. that its links must not be merely a Thinking, but, at the same time, such an organic, self-holding and supporting contemplation as we above described the contemplation of resting space to be. This, however, can be attained only after a disjunction of space from itself, after a most probably infinite multiplication of the same; and devolves, therefore, upon a new reflection. This much, however, is even now clear, that time is not that perfect correlative of space, which it has generally been considered to be. Philosophers have distinguished them as outward and inward contemplation. This is mere one-sidedness! For we should never get space outside of us if we had it not within ourselves. And are we not ourselves space? The viewing of space as an outward contemplation originated from that curious immateriality which was to be secured to us when degraded matter was no longer good enough for us. (Time stands in the same line of reflections as the true, genuine space. It is true, however, that time, on account of its relation to Thinking and as the form of Thinking, is carried higher, above all space; and this is the cause why the nature of time has been misunderstood and why it has been opposed to space.)

By the above we have made an important step toward actual knowledge. Everyone knows that all actual know-

ledge, or knowledge of the actual, must be a particular knowledge within an undetermined manifold, and that its particular character, its Being generally, consists in this very relation to the manifold. But the manifold must moreover be surveyable; must remain firm before the glance and support it. This supporting sphere we have given to Thinking by the law of succession in the eternally standing and resting space, which space, as we have described it, is precisely that which remains firm to the construction, and supports it, which does not dissolve by infinite division into nothing. But this characteristic does not *fill* space. True, it is in itself not empty (for it is full of itself), but neither is it full of anything else; in that respect it is, indeed, empty. It is nothing but the solid, same and in-itself-resting contemplation.

It is evident that our next business must be to get something into this standing sphere which can be a particular something, whereby the in-itself everywhere same space (if anyone finds that this thought, in view of the manifoldness in space, is contradictory, I have no objection) can be distinguished from itself, and the links of one series of succession can be excluded from each other. If anyone supposes, starting from the idea of space, that this something will be *matter*, he is right. But it is highly probable, in view of the peculiar character of our system, that *matter* will have here quite a different signification from the usual one. For is there not also a *spirit world*, quite as discrete as the other? We shall, therefore, probably have to proceed from the unity of these two worlds to their distinction, and prove that matter is necessarily spiritual, and spirit necessarily material; no matter without life and soul—no life except in matter.

§ 6. Deduction of Matter.

We approach the designated investigation.

Formal Freedom is *posited*. But altogether inseparable from it is a quantitating, purely as such. Formal Freedom cannot be posited, as a simple point, in and for itself, contemplating itself; for in that case it would not be posited at all; neither it nor anything would be. The point is merely its one-sided view in Thinking; but here we have *contemplation*. Necessarily, therefore, a quantitating is posited at the

same time, but only in so far as it is inseparable from the positedness of Freedom.

This quantitating, it is true, is in and for itself simple and one and the same; but thus it is again unreal and unattainable. In the reflection it is double: *Concretion* and *Discretion* in succession. Hence both are absolutely posited, and preposited to the ground-form of knowledge. We must, therefore, answer these questions: What is involved in the concretion generally, and especially in the form of formal Freedom in which it appears here? What, in the discretion to a succession, in the same respect? What, finally, in the absolute identity of both?

1. The concretion is, in regard to its substance, any particular space, even a concreting and self-supporting of manifold points which may be thought *afterwards* and *arbitrarily*. Without this *possible* manifold it is no concretion, as is immediately evident. But it is, again, not merely the space which keeps itself in equilibrium and fixes its contemplation; for then it would not be at the same time construction, and construction through Freedom. What, then, is it? An in-itself *space occupying manifold*, in which *points, penetrating each other in reciprocal concretion, can be posited infinitely, which commence, continue, and give direction to any line* with the most unbounded freedom. Agility is distributed through the whole, or can be so distributed; so also is the *solidity* of space distributed throughout the whole; and the agility, whenever it has determined itself or decided itself in a particular manner, is surrendered to this solidity—but always according to its own law and so as to remain Freedom in it, as we have shown in the preceding section. The basis is that resting, standing, space; but with it the Freedom of concretion is inseparably united.

This now is *matter*; and hence matter is the *fixed constructibility of space itself*, and nothing else whatever. Matter is not space; for space rests eternally and unshaken, and *carries* all construction; but it is *in* space; it is the construction which is carried. *Space* and *matter* are the inseparable view of one and the same, of quantitability (from the standpoint of contemplation), as *standing* and *general*, and at the same time *concrete* and *constructible*.

RESULTS.—A. Matter is necessarily a manifold ; whenever it is taken hold of, it is taken hold of as such, and it cannot be taken hold of otherwise.

B. It is infinitely divisible, without dissolving into nothingness. It is carried by the abiding space in the background, which as such (as space) is not divided at all, but within which division takes place.

C. It is necessarily and in itself organic. The ground of a motion is distributed through it, for it is the constructibility in space. It may be in rest, but it can put itself in motion simply from itself.

2. If formal Freedom is posited in both, then a *constructing* is posited. But this is, however closely we may describe it, simply, a line-drawing; it produces a line, by no means a point. But the line presupposes a direction, which again is necessarily confined to an order of succession. By the positing of formal Freedom, therefore, there is necessarily posited and preposited, prior to all self-conscious Freedom, some succession of the manifold.

Now, this original succession, seized in *contemplation* (not in Thinking, as above), results in *Time*.—It is clear that the presupposed line is infinitely divisible. True, it is completed, and in regard to space a closed whole. But between every two points which stand in the relation of succession, I can put again other points which stand in the same relation. Hence, although the contemplation, of which we here speak, is evidently unity of the glance, and although every time-moment is probably a Time-Whole, discrete and separated from all other time-moments; yet, from another view, this time-moment is again an infinitely divisible moment of the one time; and only through this infinity of floating does the time-moment receive its solidity. The characteristic conception, which was wanting heretofore, is now deduced.

Again: through this very solidity does the contemplation seize itself as an objective, self-given, immanent light. For all light consists of a floating over infinite distinguishability, quantifiability, which must be at the same time infinitely determinable and constructible. The light is not something simple, but the infinite reciprocity of Freedom with itself, the

penetration of its unity, eternity, and primitiveness, by the manifoldness and infinite determinability arising therefrom. This light must appear to itself at some point, must seize itself in real knowledge; and this point of self-seizing is the described *contemplation* in the synthesis of space, matter, and time.

3. Both—concretion as well as discretion—are the position of formal Freedom, in which both are altogether united. The latter gives time, and hence actual knowledge; the former, space and matter. But the former is also the basis and condition of the latter. Hence there is no light (no knowledge) in its essential form except in matter, and, *vice versa*, no matter is (let it be well remarked *for-itself*) except in time and its light.

But let us consider each of these points more closely.

First of all, an important remark not yet dwelt upon: There is no knowledge and no life which does not necessarily last a time, and posit itself for itself in a time. Knowledge carries, by its very form, time within itself and brings it along; a timeless knowledge—for instance, an absolutely simple point within time—is impossible. But time is altogether only a confined succession of matter in space. Hence no time is *comprehended*, and—since it must be comprehended if life and knowledgē is to be—no life and knowledge *is*, unless matter and space are comprehended. Matter can just as well be called a transformation of space into time, Freedom and knowledge; and thus time and space are regarded also in this central point as inseparably united.

Life necessarily describes itself in *matter*. *Vice versa*, matter cannot be described except by the construction of a line. But this line needs a direction; this direction a succession of points; these a knowledge in which a manifold can be united, for otherwise the line would become a point.

(If I had to do with somebody to whom I were compelled to prove the necessity of the idealistic view by one example, I should ask him: How can you ever attain a line except by keeping the points *asunder*, for else they fall together; and at the same time taking them together and annulling their being asunder, for else they never join each other? But you comprehend, undoubtedly, that this unity of the manifold-

ness, this positing and annulling of a discretion, can be only in *knowledge*; and we have just shown that it is the ground-form of knowledge. Now you ought at the same time to comprehend that space and matter consist, in exactly the same way, in such a *keeping asunder* of the points, but in a *unity*; and that they are, hence, possible only in knowledge and *as* knowledge, and that they are, indeed, the *real form of knowledge itself*.

This is now, in truth, as clear and evident as anything possibly can be; it lies right before every one who opens his eyes, and ought not first to be proved and acquired, but should be known so well that one ought to feel ashamed to have to say it.—Why, then, was it not seen? Because every thing lies nearer to us than the seeing itself, *in* which we rest; and because we have been stubbornly clinging to that objectivating which seeks outside of itself what lies only in us.)

We add two exhaustive remarks, casting light far around.

a. The ground of all actual Being (of the world of appearances) has been represented in the deepest and most exhaustive manner, partly in regard to its formal, partly in regard to its material character. The former consists in this, that the world is independent of all knowledge which is recognized by knowledge itself as knowledge; that it would be though the knowledge of it were not; again, that it is not necessarily, but could just as well not be.—We are especially particular about the first point, and it is a great error to suppose that transcendental idealism denies the *empirical* reality of the material world, &c.; it only points out in it the forms of knowledge, and annihilates it therefore as for-itself-existing and absolute.—The ground of its existence is, in one word, this: that knowledge must necessarily presuppose itself for itself, so as to be able to describe its origin and Freedom. Formal Freedom posits itself as *being*. Now this formal Freedom, in its positedness before all conscious use of Freedom, and nothing else at all, is the material world. It is related as substance to every knowledge reflecting itself as free which then is accident; hence it would be though no knowledge were. At least, this must necessarily be the conviction of him who remains in this synthesis. But everyone again who comprehends it, comprehends just what we said. (Kant calls it a

deception which we cannot get rid of. Such a phrase would merely prove that we had single light-rays, *lucida intervalla*, of the transcendental view, which vanish involuntarily. But whoever has this view in his own free power finds nowhere deception. He knows that it is necessarily thus from this standpoint, which is consequently correct; and that it is necessarily thus from the other, higher standpoint, which is consequently also correct; *but that the one absolute knowledge consists neither in the one nor in the other, but only in the knowledge of the relation of the ENTIRE system of knowledge to absolute Being.*)

b. Again: Of this resting and standing Being of the world, the two ground-qualities, spirit and matter, have been deduced from one central point as absolutely belonging to this Being, and as in themselves only a duplicity of the view of this one Being in knowledge. In so far as knowledge posits itself as being, it posits itself as matter; in so far as it posits itself as *being free*, it posits itself as a succession in time, as a standing and resting intelligence, confined to itself.

Part Third.

Knowledge posits itself for itself as an organic Power of Activity, or as a system of Feelings and Impulses.

CONTENTS OF PART THIRD.

- § 1. The determinedness of quantitating Freedom determines factical Knowledge only in part—that is, so far as it is a general determinedness;—but, in part, is determined by it—that is, so far as factical Knowledge posits the order or sequence of that determinedness. Hence knowledge is both infinite and determined.
- § 2. Knowledge in general to become factical Knowledge gathers itself into a concentration-point of reflection, infinitely repeatable, though everywhere the same; and hence, as a point or determinedness of Quantitability, a determined point of Time, Space, and Matter: a point of utterance of power.
- § 3. Knowledge posits itself for itself therefore as an acting power or a tendency, and moreover as a system of acting powers, reciprocally determined and checked, and each determined or checked utterance of which is called a *feeling*.
- § 4. The absolute power of Knowledge in manifesting itself as material *feeling* connects this feeling in perception with matter, and attributes it to matter as its cause.
- § 5. The absolute power of Knowledge cannot be thought as manifesting itself in a material feeling without being contemplated therein, and hence extended into a *direction* of feeling, and thus apprehended as *Impulse*.

INTRODUCTORY.

It is not so important to exhaust the deductions which result from our last synthesis, as to seize the spirit of the whole by the right word in the right place. What follows in the systematic progress, is clear enough to him who has the right insight; to others the separate propositions also will appear dark. Hence we prepare the following by a more general reflection.

1. Let us posit the universe as consisting of a system of single, for-themselves-closed Beings, thought in accordance with our investigation = synthesis of light and matter.

2. This system is in itself organized; the Being of each is determined by its reciprocity with all others. Now, if I bring into this system changeableness, I ask—admitting such a system, and I not only admit but assert it—is not this system, if it is to be the ultimate, a system which dissolves itself into nothingness? Evidently. Each single separate is determined by the others; where, then, does the *original determinedness* commence? This is an eternal circle, with which we content ourselves only because we tire out by *despair*. It will not do forever to borrow Being from another source; we must finally arrive at a Being which has it in its own power to be.

3. Now, in this One all Beings have part. The immediate knowledge of the relation of each separate is that separate's absolute Being, its substantial root; and this relation is not first produced by the Being of the others, but itself and all the others become absolute being to it only through this relation. But this relation carries an original duplicity within itself: it is a relation to an *ever-closed whole* (the eternal One)—for otherwise we would arrive at no standing, permanent relation, and at no standing knowledge; and, at the same time, it is a relation to an in-all-eternity *not closable whole*—for otherwise we would arrive at no free knowledge. Hence, each eye, in the infinite light-ocean of knowledge, which has been opened to itself, carries at the same time its closed and completed Being, and in this Being it bears its eternity within itself. *We comprehend always the Absolute, for outside of it there is nothing comprehensible; but, at the same time, we comprehend that we shall never comprehend it completely, for between the Abso-*

lute and Knowledge lies the infinite quantitatibility, according to which the relation of each separate to the Whole and to the Universe is both in itself closed and completed, and infinitely changing WITHIN that completion.

4. But now comes the highest question: how can knowledge arrive at this view and comprehension of a relation, tie, or order of quantitatibility, a view which lies beyond its whole inner nature? Answer: The being, the *actuality* of knowledge would be altogether impossible if the order were not also absolutely posited; knowledge cannot realize itself except within that order and its thorough determinedness; and this condition is posited simply because it is posited, beyond all factical knowledge and comprehension of the How?—Remember the synthesis of the absolute substantiality. According to the central point of that synthesis, formal Freedom, and with it knowledge, quantitating, &c., could *be*, and could *not* be, therein altogether independent of absolute Being; and this result must remain. But it was shown that if this Freedom has once come to *be*, it must materially be determined by the Absolute. Determined in what? Doubtless in that which forms its nature, its root and substance, in the quantitating. *How* then? Even as the words say, determined, i. e. confined to an original order and relation of the manifold, in which quantitating consists. Absolute formal Freedom is confined to this order, but on no account is this true of any further determinedness of Freedom *within* that order.

Finally: *To what* is formal Freedom confined? To order and relation generally; on no account to this or that order, for then it would again not be formal Freedom, but would be determined in some *inner* respect. Knowledge seized itself in some one single glance (an individual=C, to whom, we must, therefore, give a fixed relation to the universe). This, now, is that C's groundpoint, giving to him *his* relation to the universe unavoidably and unchangeably. Could—not *this* knowledge, for this knowledge is only that, the groundpoint whereof is the individual C, but—could not knowledge generally ignite itself equally well in other points? Evidently; and if it did, we should have here another order. Consequently, there is here in respect to the matter a reciprocity between absolute Being and knowledge, which, indeed, we had to arrive at.

5. Now this point of commencement beyond all real knowledge—the factual, before all fact—we cannot ascribe to that Freedom which we know in all knowledge. It falls into the incomprehensible. But how we, being posited by this incomprehensible reciprocity into life and knowledge, and hence in an altogether determined relation, can change this relation very much, while it nevertheless remains the ever co-determining basis, this we can see even now. The real is *absolute law* only for Freedom.

To sum up, and in order to connect what we have just said with the most general conceptions of the synthesis: Knowledge is *For-itself-Being* of the originating; this presupposes Not-Being, and, since this must be in knowledge, necessarily *Being* in knowledge as such. But this Being is nothing more than that whereby each knowledge that finds itself, finds itself determined through its nature. Now knowledge is again a quantitating; its confinedness is, therefore, a confinedness of the quantitating, altogether as such and altogether nothing else. Hence the already deduced ground-form of all actual in knowledge: space, matter, time. But knowledge, in seizing itself actually, is also the limitation of quantitating. Hence, drawn down to this region, that confinedness is the confinedness to such a fixed limitation in the deduced ground-forms of the actual. The determinedness of this limitation, however, depends itself upon Freedom; hence, also, the determinedness of the confinedness. Absolute Being is in knowledge law; knowledge can never be relieved of this law without losing itself; but how this law may appear to it, depends in all its possible contents, in all possible views and degrees, upon its Freedom. The highest relation of both is, therefore, not *causality* but *reciprocity*.

(I cannot deny myself here a continuation of the parallel of this system with that of Spinoza, for the sake of attaining the greatest clearness. According to Spinoza, i. e. where I interpreted his system most favorably, knowledge was, as with me, *accidence* of the absolute Being. He had really no connecting link between substance and accidence; both fell together. I connected them by the conception of *formal Freedom*. This Freedom is in itself equally independent; it is determined only *materialiter*, if it realizes itself. Now, in the same syn-

thesis we have discovered something additional and new : even the material determinedness is only *formally* unconditioned—knowledge cannot be at all without being confined;—but on no account *materially*—in regard to quantity and relation,—for this again is the result of formal Freedom.)

6. The knowledge arising from this synthesis, after we have considered all its links, is therefore *infinite*, but also *absolutely determined*; a conception which appears to be a contradiction, but which here is easily comprehended, and which in every-day life we realize almost every moment in spite of the apparent contradiction. Knowledge can exist in infinite, never-to-be-determined ways; but in whatever way it exists, it exists in a determined way and in the order of succession conditioned thereby. (The reader will please call to mind the game of chess.)

This, now, would give us the one, eternal, infinite *knowledge*, the whole accidence of absolute Being. From Being arises neither the possibility nor the reality of knowledge, as Spinoza would have it; but merely, in case of its reality, its general determinedness. Now, this thus-to-be-comprehended knowledge is itself, in relation to the knowledge *for-itself*, substance. The knowledge produced by the position of formal Freedom is therefore doubly accidence, partly of itself as knowledge, partly of absolute Being. We have hence here, in the second substantiality, explained in full the separation into a—not infinite, which, applied to reality, would be contradictory—but closed system of modifications of knowledge, which again are not modifications of knowledge in itself, but only of knowledge according to the groundpoints and successions of its seizing itself. Every such groundpoint is a *formaliter* necessary, *materialiter* altogether free limitation to one point in substantial knowledge, determined by its relation to the whole of knowledge. To the *whole*, I say. But how has that now turned into a whole, which even this very moment was a never-to-be-completed infinite? And, as we undoubtedly are not inclined to take back our word, how does it remain, together with its *totality, infinity*? (This is another important, rarely remarked, much less solved difficulty, least of all solved by Spinoza, who, without further ado, causes to proceed from the eternal substance an *infinite* series of finite

modifications, and, consequently, loses thus the conception of the *universe*, which presupposes completeness—closedness.) A whole it evidently became by the separate knowledge seizing itself even as a separate, which, as the result of a determination through all others, can be only the result of a closed sum. An Infinite it remains at the same time if this determinedness is not one of determinedness, but of determinability, as we have also posited it; from which again there results, in the same respect, the infinite modificability of that closed whole.

The actual universe is ever closed and complete, for otherwise no closed part and no knowledge could be realized within it; each would dissolve within itself. The inner substance of the universe, however, is the posited Freedom, and this is infinite. The closed and completed universe carries, therefore, an infinity within itself; and only therein is it closed, that it carries and holds this infinity.

- ‡ 1. The determinedness of quantitating Freedom determines factual Knowledge only in part—that is, so far as it is a general determinedness;—but, in part, is determined by it—that is, so far as factual Knowledge posits the order or sequence of that determinedness. Hence Knowledge is both infinite and determined.

Now in this knowledge, which we have learned to know in its most comprehensive synthesis, of what is *absolute Being* the ground, and what does it carry within itself? Evidently, simply and purely the *Being*, the standing and reposing of knowledge, which keeps it from not dissolving within itself into an empty nothing: hence, the mere pure form of *Being*, and nothing else whatever. This, however, originates in it alone.

If this synthesis alone, as the highest of knowledge, does absolute Being appear immediate; hence it is clear that nothing more can be deduced from it in a lower synthesis. Absolute Being is in knowledge only the form of Being, and remains so forever. *That which* is known, depends altogether upon Freedom; but that *something* is, and if it comes to *this* something that it is *known* (that it completely enters and is absorbed in knowledge) is grounded in absolute Being. Only the *actual* form of knowledge, the determinedness of the *known*, but not the *matter* of knowledge (which consists in Freedom)

results from absolute Being. From it results only that such a matter (Freedom) is at all possible, that it can realize itself, can become (actual) knowledge, and thus seize itself in any particular determination. Thus Freedom as well as absolute Being are both, in their respective positions, altogether mutually determined and united; the former is completely secured in its highest significance, and all absolute incomprehensibility (*qualitas occulta*) is totally eradicated from knowledge.

One incomprehensible, it is true, remains, as we have mentioned before, viz.: the absolute Freedom which precedes all actual knowledge. But this must not be confounded with the incomprehensible Being (the inscrutable will of God), for it is at the same time comprehended at every moment and correctly, as sure as we *know* anything at all. Again: we understand very well *that* it cannot be comprehended in its primitiveness, and that we likewise do not need to comprehend it thus. For that comprehending itself in its eternity and infinity consists precisely in *infinitely continuing* to comprehend: *the very reason* why it can never comprehend its own primitiveness.

Thus then is it, and thus is it necessarily comprehended by every intelligence which elevates itself in knowledge (even without the Science of Knowledge) to this view. To prove this in separate instances we have not time here; all systems and religions, and even the views of common sense, are full of propositions which result from it.

But at the same time it has been sufficiently shown from all our previous reflections, that that knowledge (in the highest synthesis of absolute Being and infinite Freedom) can begin from out itself, can become *actual* knowledge, only by an *actual contemplation* (the contemplation *in* and *for* itself, well known to us already) which limits itself within the infinite contemplability to a fixed *quantum*. That such a contemplation must be presupposed, as originally prior to all conscious Freedom and what its results are, has also been shown sufficiently. As such, this contemplation is a point in the infinite sphere of knowledge, in which knowledge seizes itself; hence a determinedness of quantifiability, which in the contemplation is changed into the one space and matter, and the one time. This point is therefore, necessarily, altogether determined in regard to each of these instances; but it can be thus determined only

by its relation to the actual (no longer infinite or undetermined) whole; hence the point is for itself only in so far as the whole is for it. This contemplation, therefore, is possible only in *Thinking*, in the free floating over that relation, and in the singling out of this one particular point *in* the whole from the universality of the latter. Thinking and contemplation penetrate each other here again; and their basis is *Feeling*, as we called it formerly: the uniting of a determinedness of Freedom and of absolute Being. In this Feeling we may, therefore, have discovered for a knowledge, with which we are not yet acquainted, however, the principle of individuality.

It is *one* of the points of concentration for the actual being of knowledge, and we take this point, of course, as a representative of all possible others. That it has the *form* of Being, its existence, from absolute Being, is clear; for otherwise no permanency of contemplation could take place at all. But its determined Being it has only from the reciprocity between its Freedom and the whole.

What then now—this is a *new* question—is the character of actual Being? Altogether only a relation of Freedom to Freedom according to a law. The *Real* (=R), which has now been found and which carries knowledge prior to actual knowledge, is, 1st, a concentration-point of all the time of that one individual, and it is comprehended as that which it is only in so far as this time is comprehended, which is, however, always comprehended and at the same time never. It is, 2d, a concentration-point of all actual individuals in this time-moment. Hence, of all the time of these, and of all hereafter possible individuals; it is the universe of Freedom in *one* point and in *all* points.

Only in so far as it remains such a concentration-point does it remain a real; otherwise it would dissolve into a simple, i. e. into an abstract nothing.

Is R then, now, something in itself, a permanent? How can it be, since its ground-substance is Freedom, the nature of which is eternal change! How then does a knowledge, nevertheless, repose on it; for instance, that of the individual, viz., J? Answer: In so far as J with his immanent freedom, according to the first synthesis—though not *in* it—reposes upon *absolute Being* (like all other individuals), can it repose on itself and

occupy a relation towards that of the other individuals, and *vice versa*. How does J know that these numbers of individuals, of which he knows, rest with their knowledge in absolute knowledge? Because otherwise he would *not* know of himself *in such a manner* as to know of them, but in another manner.

The ultimate ground of each momentary condition of the world is now discovered; it is the being and reposing of the totality of knowledge in the Absolute. It is true, that through it also the not always clearly perceived condition of each individual is determined, which again on its part determines the condition of the whole. But this ground and its result could be otherwise at every moment, and can become otherwise at every moment of the future. The highest law of that Being which carries laws is not a law of nature (law of a material being), but a law of Freedom, and is expressed in this formula: Everything *is* precisely as Freedom makes it, and does not become otherwise unless Freedom makes it otherwise.

Let us remark, however, at this place, in order to prevent possible misunderstandings, that we have here explained only the form of the actual, empirical Being (or of the taking hold of itself of knowledge). We have proved *that* a material (a *quantum* and determined relation) must be within that form; but concerning the ground of this determinedness we have been referred to absolute Freedom, or have said that this origin was incomprehensible. Now, let no one believe that here already we actually cause Freedom—as separated and isolated—to act, thus making it a real Thing *per se* and an altogether blind *chance*, in doing which we should again bring in the occult qualities, the real enemies of science. For this Freedom is in no knowledge, but is the Freedom presupposed prior to knowledge. At present we have, however, not yet arrived at any knowledge; where, then, should this Freedom be?

At some future time—and only then will our investigation be at an end—Freedom will find itself in actual knowledge *as* Freedom. It is true this Freedom, thus finding itself, will have conditions of its own being, and amongst them a *presupposed* Freedom; but it would find the presupposed Freedom *different* if it found *itself* different. From the latter only do we infer back to the presupposed Freedom, which is only thus accessible to knowledge. (What you, for instance *act*, first

opens to you the field of knowledge, and hence of your original character of Freedom.)

Now it may nevertheless be, that even this character, taken unchangeably, admits of different views of darkness or clearness, and hence degrees of power; and that in the highest degree each one *is* not limited, but limits *himself* with Freedom in knowledge.

§ 2. Knowledge in general to become factical Knowledge gathers itself into a concentration-point of reflection, infinitely repeatable, though everywhere the same; and hence posits itself as a point or determinedness of Quantitability, a determined point of Time, Space, and Matter: a point of utterance of power.

The result of the former paragraph may be expressed in the following proposition: It is absolutely necessary that the in-itself altogether one and the same knowledge should limit itself and gather itself together in a point of reflection (concentration) if it is ever to arrive at an actual knowledge; but this point of reflection is infinitely repeatable—everywhere, however, the same. Now, if we remember that this knowledge is at the same time a pure, and in all knowledge absolutely *unchangeable Thinking*, the necessity results—after the possibility of knowledge has been ascertained from the determinedness of the standpoint—that each individual must hold himself in this altogether unchangeable Thinking. In this Thinking, therefore, all outward distinctions of individuals vanish: all of them perceive the same in the same manner, gathered up into the one fundamental contemplation of quantitatibility, with all other links involved in it, and carried by the one unchangeable Thinking of it. Only the *inner* difference remains; and there is, perhaps, no more proper place in the system to explain this *inwardness* of individuality than here.

I say, *I*, and thou sayest, *I*; both sayings mean altogether the same as far as the *form* is concerned; from both there follows altogether the same as far as the *matter* is concerned; and if thou didst not hear and think mine *I*, nor I thine, this no further to be distinguished *I* might just as well be only once. How does it happen that we, nevertheless, can posit it twice, and must posit it so, and that we keep both apart as never to be mistaken the one for the other?

I answer, according to our former explanations, as follows:

1. In all former knowledge a *subjective* and an *objective*

were distinguishable. The reflection rested upon an object, which it pictured only *formaliter*; and we know at present right well that this standing object originates everywhere in pure absolute Thinking, whereas its formalizing originates in the Thinking of the accidental, as also a Being. But in the absolute self-comprehension of knowledge there is no such distinction; the subjective and objective fall immediately together, and are inseparably united; and this is not, perhaps, merely *thought* as we have thought it here, and must think it; but it *is*, is absolutely, and this very Being is knowledge, as, *vice versa*, this knowledge is also again Being. It is the absolute in-itself-reposing of knowledge, without contemplating a generating, a beginning, &c.; hence it is that *in* which and *for* which all generating and all Being is: knowledge in the form of absolute, pure Thinking, immediate feeling of existence, which flows through all particular knowledge, and carries the same, as itself is carried by absolute Being—the highest and absolute synthesis of Thinking and contemplation.

But in this immediately-felt self thine *I* is not to appear; thy Ego I merely *think*, objectively, by loosening in Thinking my own self from me and putting it before me. I know very well that this signifies the same, and that thou loosenest in the same manner mine from thee; but this immediate ground of knowledge it never will and never can become for me, because I must *rest* permanently upon my standpoint in order to be I. It designates to me merely this *form* of absolute resting, and nothing else at all; and I cannot appropriate thy Ego simply because I can never get rid of my resting. It is the eternal unchangeable *That* of knowledge—and on no account some *What*—by which all individuality is *immediately* determined.

Hence everybody objectivates individuality, repeating it, and only through all individualities does he view the universe (in its one general contemplation wherein he stands) from his own point of reflection (of individuality).

The Isolation demonstrated here, in consequence of which I place thee outside of me, only thinking, not feeling thee, well knowing that thou performest the same operation in the same way, may possibly be the innermost ground of all other isolations and sequences of series, which we discovered above,

but which here we have blotted out by the too general standpoint of our investigation.

2. The question which remained unanswered above and was posited as incomprehensible: What is the ground of the particular determinedness of the point of reflection (point of individuality)? is now answered in the following manner:

From the mere empty form of knowledge—from the possibility of a knowledge generally—follows the determinedness or the limited seizing itself of knowledge in any simple point of reflection, but only the determinedness *generally* and in regard to the form; and from it follows also the material, as everywhere and altogether the same. There is no *particular* determinedness at all.

And thus it may, perhaps, appear that the original particular determinations in space and in time, which we have nevertheless discovered in contemplation, are also merely formal and figurative, but nothing *in themselves*, nothing which would hold firm to the unchangeable Thinking; and that if, finally, distinctions amongst these individuals should nevertheless be discovered, they can not be grounded in an original Freedom beyond all knowledge, but in a Freedom which is comprehended and understood as such.

3. Knowledge posits itself for itself therefore as an acting power or a tendency, and moreover as a system of acting powers, reciprocally determined and checked, and each determined or checked utterance of which is called a *feeling*.

The last result has removed an undecidedness of our former reflections, and at the same time we have obtained a further progress in the whole synthesis.

The in-itself-resting original contemplation of knowledge found itself (1) *outwardly* as a constructing, line-drawing, in a constructible *space*; (2) *inwardly* and for-itself from the one side as one and the same living *matter*, everywhere penetrated by life and liberty; and (3) and from the other side as lasting a certain time, as passing through a manifoldness of points one-sidedly dependent upon each other: *time*. This was the form of the actually posited inward and outward contemplation, its *That*, and was the immediate result of the positing of formal Freedom. But we could not account for the limitation of the *quantum* in that contemplation; the contemplation did not, therefore, appear, as in itself confined and limited,

and it was only generally asserted that the contemplation must be confined to a necessary limitation; this limitation we temporarily only pictured.

Now this omission has been supplied; through the absolute union of Thinking and contemplation we have demonstrated knowledge—in the individuality-points, in which alone it can be actual—as the absolutely finished, closed and completed result of a reciprocity within this inner manifoldness. It cannot go beyond its own limit whenever it actually seizes itself, and hence also its contemplation is limited as necessarily *its own*, and receives thus the character of empirical reality.

Again: what was designated above in the immediate For-itself-being as *Feeling*, becomes now in the contemplation—which has been united in a synthesis with Thinking, and which is necessarily an original quantitating—*Construction*; and its point of commencement—the very representative of the immediate point of self-seizing or feeling—becomes on that very account absolute, immanent *power*. This power is the found Freedom of constructing absolutely in one *point*, and hence is for the construction its point of commencement. Power is distinguished from mere Freedom as determined Being from general constructing, and as the ground of another Being from the general ground of constructing; it is the *found* (discovered) Freedom which seizes itself in such a point of individuality or of feeling, and hence—in regard to the seizing organ—the absolute synthesis of contemplation and feeling.

We thus have discovered another link for the characterization of empirical knowledge.

1. The Ego is not all (for itself) without ascribing power to itself, for it is Freedom which seizes itself in a *fixed* point; but Freedom is quantitating, and this, fixed in contemplation, is determined quantity. Hence it is impossible to posit power in self-contemplation without a manifestation of this power within this determined quantity, and as itself altogether determined. (We have here again the old synthesis, already known to us, of *Thinking* and *contemplation*, confinedness and determinedness, within a *general* sphere of quantitating.)

2. This manifestation of power, whatever it may be, is altogether originally and immediately found, and hence does not presuppose a prior Freedom in knowledge; nor is it at all an

arbitrary Freedom. For the consciousness of the power is an inseparable component of the absolutely existing knowledge, from which again the contemplation of a manifestation of the power is inseparable. Hence as soon as knowledge seizes itself, this manifestation is already there. (Which manifestation may, perhaps, be an organic one—in short, *organic life* itself.) And thus again, when we (i. e. the Science of Knowledge) elevate ourselves to Thinking, all individuals are equal. They are *all power*, in form; not this or that power. They are the positedness of formal Freedom even as a ready-found Being—and are nothing else at all—which Freedom can be repeated in infinite points, and is everywhere the same.

3. The determinedness of this Being, or of this power, is now altogether only for itself, i. e. in a knowledge existing for itself and confined to itself. But for this determinedness the power is determined not in itself, but only through its manifestations. The whole determined knowledge is therefore a knowledge not of power or powers, but of a system of manifestations of power. But these are determined only in their reciprocity with all others in the universe. By their relation to it, therefore, the power is determined in the same original manner.

4. Now this determinedness is, even if we look only upon the contemplation, a something divisible according to time and space. The Ego, therefore, whenever it seizes itself as determined power, encircles itself necessarily as living and as manifesting itself in a solid, lasting moment (it contemplates itself in the time-life), and also in space, as a *quantum* of everywhere and throughout animated and free matter (the body, the living matter which contemplates itself and is contemplated as Ego in space). But this Ego, in the empirical knowledge of which we speak here, is altogether confined to itself and cannot go beyond itself; hence it cannot also go beyond this contemplation of its time and materiality. However far perception may reach, this fundamental determinedness is its one, immovable basis. The body, thus seized in the original contemplation, remains the same, as sure as the Ego rests upon itself in all perception; and all perception, as sure as it is carried back in contemplation to its principle, its point of commencement, is carried back to the body; *all feeling, contemplation, perception of outwardness, is in reality only the*

self-feeling, self-contemplation of the change which has passed within the body. Moreover: the Ego cannot get out of its own time. This own time of the Ego now is it of which we speak here—not the general time, not the life of the one universe and the passing of events within it; a view to which the Ego can elevate itself only from *its own* time, and by abstracting from its own time. Now, it is very clear that this own time is not perceived, but only thought; it is evidently a conception. But in it is perceived whatever is perceived. *The Ego is confined to itself, and this absolute confinedness determines the character of empirical knowledge:* is a proposition which now signifies, *the Ego is confined to the identity of its body*—I say *identity*, for only from it, from the unchangeable point, can a body be at all comprehended—and to the subjective, inner identity of its time, or of its time life.

‡ 4. The absolute power of Knowledge in manifesting itself as material *feeling* connects this feeling in perception with matter, and attributes it to matter as its cause.

A. Now, in regard to this individual time, it is important to explain the possibility of a single closed moment of perception within it, and the real significance and contents of this moment; i. e. of a moment *in* the individual time, not of itself, for itself is not perceived, but thought. According to the explanation of the system of knowledge through Thinking, the substance of this moment is reciprocity of the manifestation of my power with the power of the universe. But this manifestation is, in regard to its matter, Freedom; this Freedom is infinite, and if knowledge rested *merely* upon it, it would never become *actual* knowledge. In order to become such, it must tear itself away from it after the manner of Thinking, must seize the infinite Real—picturing it, if I may say so—within unity. This, we have seen, is the form of the law, according to which alone we can explain the occurrence of such a knowledge, completed (closed) within a moment. Hence, in order to make the application at once, the point of the single perception itself must involve a duplicity, the links of which are related to each other as Thinking is to contemplation, and between which, if we divide them in Thinking—this is important—the same absolute *hiatus* lies, which can be filled up by no reflection, but which constitutes the ultimate, the unattain-

able of knowledge, and which we have discovered everywhere between Thinking and contemplation. By the first link, the Ego seizes itself; by the second, it goes out of itself into the world and seizes itself in the world; but there is no Ego without a world, and no world without an Ego.

Now it is clear, and needs not to be recalled, that the Ego does not apply this law here with Freedom, since it is altogether confined in itself; only we, from our super-actual standpoint, explain it by that law which has been demonstrated in its universality. In the Ego itself it is thus, and if it were not thus there would be no knowledge; this determinedness of knowledge is precisely the Being of knowledge itself in *this* moment, or in *this*, &c. Without this Being of knowledge even our questions about it would be without sense.

This, for the present, merely to explain the possibility of such single moments. Next, it was important to deduce from some one point, as necessarily connected with it, others—nay, an infinite succession of other points. If this is not done, knowledge is never explained from itself and comprehended in itself; an occult quality is always necessary, from which to derive a new time, after having used up the present moment.

This, according to the foregoing, is easy, and explains again what we have just said. For in every moment the contemplation floats over an infinite: but, in order to seize it in *actual* contemplation, it must determine it, must limit it in a closed moment; actual contemplating and limiting is one. But this limiting is at the same time only a determining *within* the infinity. Thus *Thinking* is added to contemplation in an equally primitive manner; and this law of eternal reciprocity between contemplating and Thinking, a limiting and a positing of infinity, results in a never-to-be-completed infinity of single time-moments, joined together in a line. The solidity of time is derived not from limitation and closedness, but from the infinity which has been absorbed into it.

Originally there is a *series of Thinking* within the one matter of knowledge: within Freedom and quantitating. If this series of Thinking itself is *thought*, then the entire, infinite series is comprehended. But when it is *contemplated* actually, and hence *realiter* and limited, then you have *empirical knowledge*. The individualities also are such a line—not, however,

like the former one, reposing in contemplation, and *productions* of that original synthesis of contemplation and Thinking—but the infinity of that synthesis, which on its part finds its unity and basis in absolute Being, realizes and actualizes itself in those individualities.

2. Let us now drop that which in these thus described moments of perception carries the form of contemplation, and let us consider the form of identity. How, then, do the discrete moments of time hang together? Precisely in the thinking of time generally as the law of knowledge; but, as a *flowing* infinity, one-sidedly dependent upon each other. The Ego therefore, in its own self-contemplation, is in the same original manner confined to their *succession*; this succession in its partial determinedness can be no further explained or demonstrated as necessary. The law says only that some succession is necessary. (The fundamental character of empirical knowledge, or of pure perception in time-succession.) In every moment a further time is appropriated by Thinking and contemplation, and thus room is made in advance for concrete perception and a sphere prepared for it; but it cannot be ascertained by deduction what will fill up this time. This will be known only when that time shall have come, for the progressive development of the existing Ego extends into it. An actual perception is something altogether *new* for the perception itself, and can never be discovered *a priori*.

Hence so much is clear respecting the formal character of this knowledge: it is the altogether *immediate* knowledge, the knowledge which constitutes the time-being of him who knows: a Being which is simply knowledge, a knowledge which is simply Being; which, therefore, in itself isolated and discrete, is in every way primitively determined, and can, therefore, be neither actually nor genetically explained;—in one word, that which language terms most properly the *Feelings* (in the plural and *κατ' ἐξουχίαν*) red, green, &c. That these feelings are the result of the reciprocity between each individual and the universe is what knowledge asserts when explaining itself. But how the forces of nature accomplish it, and in accordance with what rule and law they manifest themselves precisely in this manner, this no one will ever be

able to say, and this is the very absolute *hiatus* already described. Nor shall any one ever desire to say it; for, if he did, his knowledge would have been extinguished, and hence he would not say it. At the same time, it must not be understood so, as if the forces of nature manifested themselves in these feelings; both are nothing in themselves, and both are simply the relation of knowledge to absolute Being, which can never be comprehended in contemplation and facticity.

3. One other chief characteristic: The discrete within time—the series of actual feelings—is, according to all we have previously said, a mere absolute knowledge, altogether as such. Again, it is an empirical unity; it is *my* knowledge, connecting for me through time, and through nothing else: I am this my knowledge, and this my knowledge is I. There is no other I, no general I. The significance of this knowledge in *Thinking* (if thinking goes beyond it and explains it) is, that it is the knowledge of my Being in the universe. This it is to-day as it was yesterday, and it will be in all eternity in the same manner. What, then, is changed by the progress of my knowledge? It progresses through a chain of links dependent on each other one-sidedly: it is only formal; hence it can be changed only in its *form*, not in its *matter*, which remains the same. But the pure form of knowledge in regard to quantifiability is *clearness*. Hence by its progress it increases in clearness, which it expands over the knowledge of the universe; but this gradation is infinite.

Contemplation externalizes however, and transfers upon an objective universe what lies concealed in the Ego in the ground-form of contemplation; this is known from what we have said before.

B. Having described the formal character of perception, let us now review the entire synthesis artistically. Its inner central point, the focus of knowledge, is, in form, a material feeling. This is in *Thinking* (on no account in the immediate *perception*; hence, for the present, we only know of it, but itself knows nothing of it yet) a manifestation of the absolute power of the Ego. This power is the substance of the Ego, its own, inner nature, in which knowledge reposes forever; the manifestation is accident, but only *formaliter*; it can be, or not be; but if it is, it is necessarily that mani-

festation which it is, for it is determined by its unchangeable relation to the universe.

a. Altogether the same synthetical form appears here which we met in the highest synthesis of substantiality: as the one knowledge is related to absolute Being, i. e. as its formal accident, thus individual knowledge is related to the Being of individuality, which itself is, as we know well enough, nothing but the Being of the one knowledge, finding itself actual in an infinite number of points of concentration.

b. The power, I said, is the substance of the Ego; it is always, whether the manifestation is or is not;—not in itself, however, for, unless each of these links in the synthesis is, there is no knowledge; but only after knowledge has developed itself, and thinks itself, is this power to be presupposed by every determined manifestation (which can and cannot be).

c. The entire synthesis is produced in Thinking; hence only through Freedom. The actual knowledge can be, therefore, though this Thinking is not. Knowledge itself reposes in feeling, and this is the first absolute point which must be if an actual knowledge is to be.

The material feeling is for the knowledge which compresses itself into a moment and seizes itself within it (and which, in so far as it is quantifiable, can progress infinitely in clearness)—a mere pure Being—of the Ego in immediate feeling, of the universe in contemplation.

Let this latter point be noted. True, it has been sufficiently demonstrated and explained by the foregoing, but its importance deserves some additional remarks. We know that in contemplation the contemplating intelligence loses itself: hence, in spite of the contemplation, there is in it no Ego at all; and only in the feeling does it seize *itself* in the form of Thinking. Now consciousness rests neither in the one nor in the other, but in both. Hence, if the material feeling (red, sour, &c.) is viewed from the one side as affection of the Ego, and from the other side as quality of the Thing, this duplicity itself is already a result of the dividing reflection. In actual knowledge, which no reflection can reach, it is neither the one nor the other, but both; both, however, inseparable and still undistinguishable; and in consequence of this absolute identity the distinguishing reflection must also posit both as

inseparable. No subjective feeling, no objective quality, and *vice versa*. (To speak strictly, therefore, the internal is not transferred upon the object, as transcendental Idealism may have expressed itself in opposing 'dogmatism, nor does the objective come into the soul; but both are thoroughly one. The soul, taken objectively—the feelings—is nothing but the world itself; and the world, with which we have to deal here, is nothing but the soul itself.)

The contemplation, which we are now discussing, is a constructing of space=matter. Hence, the feeling, as quality, is melted together with the matter—i. e. with a matter in the compact, ever-reposing space—but excluded from the matter in which I live (from my body). For, the former *I perceive*; my materiality, however, I do not perceive, but only think, as the *terminus a quo* of all perception. (Here again it appears why no individual can mistake anything outside of himself for himself, since the perceived matter is always outside of him.) But it is a constructing with a *quantum* of matter, since the infinity must be compressed by the form of thinking into a unity. Thus matter is here the bearer of the quality, which is its accident.

(There are in knowledge a number of places where dogmatism can be altogether refuted and idealism plainly proved. This is one of them: Is matter to be altogether perceptible to the feelings, even inwardly? I evidently assume this. How, then, do I know it? Not by particular perception; hence by the law of perception generally. I must have penetrated matter in my knowledge at once with the thought of perceptibility, as its continual *substratum*. Matter, therefore, is a *conception*, and is based upon the Thinking of a *relation*.)

This as a characteristic of contemplation in regard to space and matter; now the same in regard to time. The power of the Ego manifests itself only in an absolutely determined time-succession, that is, as determined by the fundamental character of time, namely: to admit only a succession of moments which are dependent upon each other one-sidedly. Evidently each new moment is a new, previously not known, character of the determined power; the power, as a determined power, is, therefore, seized by consciousness only in the progress of time, ever *clearer* and more and clearer. Entirely

clear it would be recognized only through the completion of the infinite time, which in reality is impossible, but can here well be thought figuratively. The contents of all the moments of the lifetime is, therefore, determined by the fundamental character of this power, and their succession, by the enlightenment which knowledge gets of this character. *Such* a time lies therefore in *such* a being, which knows of itself in an immediate manner. Another being, if it were possible, would give other time-contents and another time-succession. Only in pure Thinking is Being compressed into one point; in empirical knowledge it receives a time-character, which as such is altogether and irrevocably determined.

Hence in all possible time lies hidden the only possible true Being, which, however, has not yet become completely clear to itself, but has attained only a certain degree of clearness; and this Being bears at every moment that degree of clearness which is possible (and hence necessary) from the character of the time passed before it, and the time awaiting it in an infinite future.

‡ 5. The absolute power of Knowledge cannot be thought as manifesting itself in a material feeling without being contemplated therein, and hence extended into a *direction* of feeling, and thus apprehended as *Impulse*.

The substance of the former reflection was, in its true significance, a manifestation of power, considered as a point in time. Its picture is the construction of a line. From every point an infinite number of lines are possible, according to the infinity of possible directions, and the actual line depends altogether upon the direction, and is itself that direction actualized.

1. The Ego, which takes hold of itself, is a point within the everywhere extended space. It cannot manifest itself except in a direction. Now, this direction is everywhere and altogether a determining of a point; but the point is the picture of the Ego. The direction, therefore, is to be considered as necessarily grounded in the Ego, or the direction is itself the Ego of the contemplation. The Ego is contemplated only in it, and by means of it as its directing power. In this knowledge of the direction lies the focus of contemplation in our new synthesis. We must at present proceed to describe it (*a*) in regard to its substance, and (*b*) in regard to its form.

a. So far as its substance is concerned it has altogether the form of a line within space, of the progressing from one point and through it to another point. Freedom, however, is in the whole line; i. e. the possibility that in each point the direction, and hence the line, may cease or change into other infinite directions. A consciousness of infinite *constructibility*, and, with regard to the actually constructed, of the *accidental-ity* of the same.

b. In regard to its *form*, the synthesis is a curious, and in its results, which will soon appear, very important compound of *contemplation* and *Thinking*. For if in *each* point the Freedom of direction, the taking hold of and continuing the line (for this is the intrinsic part of this contemplation) were thought, we should never arrive at a line. It is therefore necessary to assume a forgetting of self in the contemplation in order to be able to explain the concretion of the line; but it is equally necessary to assume a self-comprehension in the contemplation, a thinking within it, and a going beyond it, in order to give it the *direction*, without which it also would be no line. Hence both are necessarily united; it is a contemplating Thinking, and a thinking contemplation. In the reflection it is divided, and then we have not the one if we have the other, although the being held together of both beyond the reflection forms the real character of that conception.

(No direction, without a permanent manifold, which is not included in the direction at all; and *vice versa* no manifoldness for the Ego without direction. Thus here also real and ideal ground fall together and are one.)

2. We shall now develop the synthesis in its further connection. The Ego, of which we speak, is confined to itself—is a *Being*. The taking hold of the direction is therefore in the same manner immediate and actual, as we have described the character of empirical knowledge to be. Every one calls this Acting, i. e. altogether in a physical point of view. The picture of it is a *continued determining* of the given construction of matter through Freedom, i. e. here through material force and motion. Further than this no material acting reaches, and the ground of it is hidden here: it is a separating and external reuniting of matter, but never an organizing of matter from within, which latter is the character of the

original construction. Let it be well understood, I do not say that acting in itself takes place, for this is wrong, but that a knowledge of a real acting is the condition of all knowledge, and is in the present synthesis the lowest focus of all knowledge.

3. The Ego is in the empirical standpoint altogether tied down to its Being; but its Being, its discovered and discoverable Being, is nothing else than the result of its reciprocity with the universe, or it is itself the universe in one of its original points of penetration. A ground is posited in the Ego, means, therefore, the same as if we said: it is posited in the world. Indeed, only here does an Ego first enter knowledge; but this Ego is here nothing but the thought of the mere positedness of formal Freedom, of the *That* without any *What*; it is an objective, empirical, by no means pure Thought; it is an altogether empty, formal Ego, without any reality as yet. Hence, what we said just now: that contemplation and Thinking are here united in a peculiar manner—the Ego not positing itself in all points as giving the direction, but being swept along—receives here a more extensive and highly important significance. Its Freedom is altogether only its thought; the direction is contained in its *Being in the Universe*. The existing, actual Ego (as it ought to be called, since it is an empirical, real acting) gives itself the direction, or this point of Being in the universe *has* the direction: both statements mean altogether the same. Only the glance, the self-comprehension of knowledge, is matter of absolute Freedom, as has been exhaustively shown; if this were not, there would be no direction either, and no manifestation of power, and it would be impossible to speak any more about anything at all. But if this glance is, then the *direction* is there at the same time in its complete determinedness, and everything else which results therefrom. The manifestation of the original power, of which we have just spoken, unites, therefore, in an equally immediate manner with that glance; and hence that glance is—I believe it is called so—the feeling of an *impulse*, and its substance also is unchangeably determined by the Universe. Impulse, or the substantial in relation to an accident, it is only in so far as from its mere formal positedness, the *formaliter* free knowledge, does not follow as yet (this may join

it or not, and hence it is accident)—but on no account as if it could proceed in this or in a contrary direction (to *a* or to $-a$), which would be contradictory, and is one of the absurdities which have been ascribed to transcendental Idealism. Only in this opposition is it impulse; united with the reflection (the formal knowledge), it becomes an empirical physical acting, as we have described it.

Result.—I act never, but in me acts the universe. But in reality this does not act either, and there is no acting; I merely view as acting the doing of the universe, in the reflection of the same, as Ego. Hence, also, there is no real, empirical Freedom—i. e. within the limits of the empirical. If we desire to attain Freedom, we must elevate ourselves to another region.

(How greatly has the Science of Knowledge been misunderstood when it said, “We must start from a *pure acting*,” a proposition which, in our present exposition, is still of the future; and when this was supposed to mean the perishable acting which we carry on commonly—gathering stones and scattering them.)

4. Thus the universe, as the sphere of empirical knowledge, is still further determined, and we will at once make the application. This universe is a living system of impulses, which continues to develop itself in an infinite time in all the points, where it is seized by a knowledge according to a law contained within its own being, and which carries within it, it is true, the possibility of a knowledge, but on no account knowledge itself. (Here again we find a chief point of distinction, or rather a result from the one point which distinguishes the true idealism of the Science of Knowledge from Spinozistic* systems. In these latter systems empirical Being is assumed to carry knowledge within itself, as a necessary result, as a higher degree of it. But this is against the inner character of knowledge, which is an absolute originating, an originating from the substance of Freedom, not of Being; and shows the want of an intellectual contemplation of this knowledge. The same relation of knowledge to Being which has been discovered in absolute knowledge and Being—i. e. that the former has only an accidental Being in relation

* Alluding to Schelling's System.

to the latter as yet, is its accident, arising from the absolute (which, therefore, might also *not* be) realization of Freedom;—must everywhere and in every form remain the same. In empirical knowledge, we make the material world itself absolute Being, and with perfect justice, but the philosophical standpoint is to be a higher one, and is to be the transcendental standpoint.

5. We add the following remark:—The impulse expresses the mere Being, without any knowledge as yet; hence it is mere nature. The latter is expressed in a material body, in the form of space as form of body. It is organic manifestation. Only through Thinking does the point enter, and the form of construction from it, the form of a line. Now it is true that this is the only possible *immediate* mode of acting of the intelligences; but it has its ground simply in the form of knowledge. This is, therefore, only another view of the organizing form of body, and both are one beyond the Factual. The mechanical (we will call it so to distinguish it from the other) and organic manifestations are in themselves not different, but they are merely a duplicity of view. There is no mechanical action except through organic (evermore organically renewing itself) power—*real ground*; and again, no organization can be comprehended except through a picturing of the mechanism—*ideal ground*. Both are related like contemplation and Thinking, and each is inseparable from the other, and is the each-other-presupposing, double-point-of-viewing, the so-often-referred-to knowledge—*κατ' ἐξοχῆν*.

KANT'S SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTALISM.

By A. E. KROSEN.

II.

The second book of the Critic of Practical Reason treats of the Dialectic of Practical Reason, the first book, or the Analytic, having developed the principle of Practical Reason as well as the application of that principle in the empirical world. That application, or the object of that principle, was there